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Abstract: The creation of modern, democratic institutions during the past two centuries is 
accompanied by expanding claims about human rights, claims that include an ever wider set of 
people and conditions.  A parallel development is a growing recognition of the role technology plays 
in controversies about human rights and the boundaries of citizenship.  Beginning in the 1960s, the 
worldwide movement of people with disabilities reveals the close connection between human rights 
claims and specific technological patterns.  Lessons from this movement point to new ways of 
thinking about human rights and their practical realization in modern society. 
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Resumen: La creación de las instituciones democráticas modernas durante los últimos dos siglos ha 
venido acompañada de reivindicaciones de derechos humanos, incluyendo un conjunto mayor de 
beneficiarios y de condiciones.  Un  desarrollo paralelo es el reconocimiento cada vez mayor del 
papel que la tecnología juega en las controversias sobre los derechos humanos y las fronteras de la 
ciudadanía. Un movimiento global de personas discapacitadas que comienza en los años 60 revela la 
fuerte conexión entre las reivindicaciones de derechos humanos y modelos tecnológicos específicos. 
Este movimiento ofrece lecciones que apuntan a nuevas formas de pensar los derechos humanos y su 
puesta en práctica en la sociedad moderna. 
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In the fall of 1962 at about the time I arrived on the University of California 
Berkeley campus as a freshman, a Bay Area newspaper contained the headline: 
“Hopeless Cripple Attends UC Classes.”  The news report concerned a new 
student, Ed Roberts, a young man from the Bay Area who had been stricken with 
polio in his youth, a disease that left him quadriplegic and in need of a respirator. 
Earlier the university had admitted Ed’s dossier but not his person.  As one 
campus administrator observed, “We’ve tried cripples before and it didn’t 
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work.”1 But Roberts and his family persisted, overcoming the resistance of the 
university officials and state bureaucrats who recognized that he was qualified, 
but maintained that the campus was simply not equipped to educate someone 
confined to a wheel chair. 
Roberts studied as an undergraduate and later graduate student in 
political science, living at Cowell Hospital on campus in special facilities that 
eventually included several other disabled students.  Ed was in some of my 
classes and I knew him in passing.  Emboldened by the civil rights movement, 
the Free Speech Movement and the climate of campus activism, Roberts and his 
colleagues at Cowell began to hatch strategies for change.  In the late 1960s they 
emerged as the Rolling Quads, a group of radical quadriplegic activists 
demanding the recognition of the rights of people with disabilities.  They made 
demands on the university, the City of Berkeley, the State of California and, 
eventually, the federal government of the United States.   
By the early 1970s they had established the Center for Independent 
Living, where they set out to demonstrate that disabled people were perfectly 
ready to take care of themselves and become full members of society with 
important contributions to make.2 
This movement soon cropped up in other parts of the country.  
Eventually it became a worldwide civil rights campaign, bringing sweeping 
reforms in public understanding and public policy, along with thorough revision 
of the language, judgment and practices that in retrospect seem not only unjust 
but perfectly absurd.  It is, I would argue, one of the most effective and 
overwhelmingly positive democratic movements of recent history.  For public 
policy in the United States, the crowning moment came in 1990 with the passage 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.3   
Ed Roberts went on to become the Director of the California 
Department of Rehabilitation, a MacArthur Fellow, and co-founder of a number 
of organizations for rights of the disabled.  He died of natural causes in 1996.  
The Ed Roberts Campus in Berkeley California is being built to honor his legacy.  
His wheel chair is included in the Smithsonian Institution’s “Shrine to the 
Famous.”4  In his own way, Ed was a political leader equivalent to Martin Luther 
1 Quoted in Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights 
Movement (New York: Times Books, 1993), p. 45 
2 Shapiro, op cit, chapter 2. 
3 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/pubs/ada.txt 
4 Smithsonian Institution, “Ed Robert’s wheel chair about 1978.”  The description observes, 
“Outfitted with the type of seat used in Porsche automobiles and a large headlight for traveling at 
night, this motorized wheelchair captures the unique personality of a man who dedicated his life to 
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King, a rare individual who helped modern societies recognize and address long 
standing patterns of injustice.  
The story about the movement of people with disabilities sheds light on 
two important political developments.  First, with the creation of modern, 
democratic institutions during the past two centuries one sees a continuing 
expansion of claims about human rights, claims that include an ever wider set of 
people and conditions.  Second, along with this expansion in the understanding 
of human rights one notices a growing importance of technology in controversies 
about human rights and the boundaries of democratic citizenship. 
 In world political history, one can locate numerous ideas that we can, 
roughly speaking, translate formulations about rights as we would use that term 
today.  For example, in ancient Greek City states, men and women, citizens and 
slaves were allotted different roles, freedoms and possibilities for action – 
different “rights” we might say -- although the Greeks did not employ language 
of that kind to describe their judgments and practices.  In the West, the historical 
moment in which explicit, continuing attention to political and moral issues 
focused upon conceptions of “rights” arrived in the 17th and 18th centuries when 
a series of upheavals tried to modify or overthrow monarchical forms of political 
and social life.  Under the old system, what a person could do or who a person 
could be was defined by one’s superior, one’s patron.  If one wanted to marry, to 
travel, to start a business of some kind, one had to receive permission from one’s 
patrons and, indeed, permission from an elaborate system of patronage that 
exercised oversight upon life’s key choices.5 
 In a very practical way, claims about “rights” offer an alternative to this 
subservient, hierarchical way of life.   Claims about “rights” often come up when 
someone or some group confronts oppression or the presence of obnoxious 
barriers and seeks to remove them.  People begin to say, “We don’t have to ask 
permission and we don’t have to put up with the conditions someone else 
imposes.  We have a right to speak freely, publish a newspaper, buy and sell 
property, go to the church of our choosing….”   At that point the question 
                                                                                                                                   
securing rights, freedoms, and improved quality of life for people with disabilities. Ed Roberts, who 
was paralyzed by polio at a young age, began his activist career in 1962 when he fought for the right 
to attend the University of California at Berkeley. He went on to help establish the first independent-
living centers for disabled people in the United States and traveled the world campaigning for 
disability rights.”  http://www.smithsonianlegacies.si.edu/objectdescription.cfm?ID=127 
5 An excellent description of how the broader influence of monarchy affected everyday life is 
presented in Gordon Wood. The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1993). 
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becomes:  Upon what basis are such claims justified?  Who finds the claims 
compelling and begins to act upon them? 
A person says, “I have a justified claim –a right -- to something” and 
then names what that something is.   That claim is supported by moral and 
political arguments that the advocate believes to be decisive.  Discourse about 
rights is one among many possible ways to describe the moral and political 
landscape undergoing change. There are alternative descriptions, alternative 
kinds of reasons used to argue for particular decisions and policies. One could, 
for example, begin with arguments about distributive justice or a theory about 
the greatest good for the greatest number. What characterizes discussions about 
rights is that the key claims are often embattled.   
One reason for stiff resistance to assertions about rights is that, if one’s 
claim is accepted, then someone, some person or institution, must recognize an 
obligation to recognize and act upon the right you demand.  Any social 
movement that carries the label “rights” could just as well be labeled an 
“obligations movement.”  Thus, Ed Roberts and his colleagues might have called 
their initiative, “The movement demanding recognition of society’s obligations 
to people with disabilities.”  Obviously, language of that stripe does not have 
quite the same appealing ring.  Professionals in advertising would say, “We’ll 
need something a bit more positive and catchy.”  For the title of his revolutionary 
manifesto, Tom Paine chose The Rights of Man not The Obligations of Man.  
It is not my purpose here to explore the foundational justification for 
rights that have been proposed over the years – foundations in nature, reason, the 
will of the God, the consensus of nations, social contract, and so forth, although 
they are certainly interesting and urgent matters.  For the moment I want to 
observe that during the past two centuries one can track the expansion of claims 
about rights to include ever wider categories of claimants and conditions.  At the 
time of the revolutions in the United States, France, and other countries in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,  it seemed good enough to refer to how it 
was that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights,” that governments must recognize the basic “rights of 
man and citizen” and similar declarations.  These sweeping and hopeful 
assertions seemed to encompass literally everybody, every member of the human 
community.  From that standpoint one might conclude that the work of 
identifying and affirming rights was nearly complete.   
 Alas, if one looked more closely, the bold universalism of eighteenth 
and nineteenth century revolutionary declarations was not reflected even in post-
revolutionary practice. At the founding of the United States, for example, women 
were generally not included in many of the rights indicated in the Constitution.  
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Persons of African descent who were owned and used as slaves had no rights at 
all.  Native Americans were stripped of most rights, including the right to live on 
lands they had occupied for millennia.  At the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, only white, male, property owning citizens had the right to vote.   
 Looking at conditions in the middle of the 19th century Karl Marx 
pointed out that the claims of bourgeois revolutionaries to have brought about an 
era of universal rights of man was belied by the property relationships involved 
in capitalism.  Thus, working class people had few rights of any practical value 
in their everyday lives.  Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there 
arose a growing set of social movements that challenged barriers to the exercise 
of a wide range of human rights. Conditions that confronted working people 
were again and again identified as violations of workers rights.   Throughout the 
19th and early 20th century a wide range of heated issues about rights arose in the 
context of working conditions, child labor,  demands for shorter hours, 
education, social security, and the like. 
Within another setting during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century one sees the rise and expanding influence of the civil rights movement 
focused upon racial injustice.  Eventually a growing groundswell sparked a 
political crisis in the U.S., one that challenged (and vexed) the country from the 
late 1940s through the 1960s.   
In the aftermath of World War II, in response to the Holocaust and the 
creation of the United Nations as well as worldwide movements for 
decolonization, there arose a growing sense of urgency to recognize and affirm 
human rights in general.  Many began to ask: Isn’t it time to get serious about the 
rights people may claim simply by virtue of being human?  The result was the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1948.6   
 Another important chapter in the story of expanding claims about rights 
is that of movement for women’s rights.  Beginning with a series of strong 
articulations in the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth 
century it finally blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s in many parts of the world, 
demanding full, equal rights for women.    
 In 1969 yet another movement that had been brewing quietly for many 
decades surfaced loudly in the demands of those seeking equal rights for gay 
people.  
                                                          
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.  http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 
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Less prominent, but no less significant, were movements from the same 
period of history,  movements demanding recognition of the rights of indigenous 
people, the rights of prisoners, the rights of children and the elderly.  One can 
also mention the philosophical and social movement that articulated claims 
having to do with the rights of animals, relevant because it is more than anything 
else an “obligations movement,” calling attention to the obligations human have 
to other species.   
Today, of course, there are still political movements that advance rights 
claims and are resisted, as always, by opponents who deny that any such rights 
exist at all.  The right of marriage of same sex couples is a controversial subject 
of that kind.  While some see this practice as a logical development covered by 
principles of “equal justice under law,” others denounce same sex marriage (or 
civil union) as contrary to nature and the divinely prescribed order of the world.  
In many ways the debate resembles disputes about the right of people of different 
races to marry, a question finally settled in the U.S. as recently as 1967 in the 
Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia.7  
 Characteristic of rights movements from the nineteenth century to our 
own time has been the emergence of distinct groups, comprising much of our 
population, who have decided to make strong claims, defying both overt and 
subtle limits that had been imposed upon them by traditional society.  It is not 
surprising that these claims often meet fierce resistance.  Opponents say, “No, 
you have no such right.  What you’re saying is absurd.  What you’re asking 
violates the natural order, overturns rightful institutions in society, threatens the 
proper relationships among people.”  Or opponents sometimes say, “Your claims 
have some validity, but it would be just too costly to provide remedies.”   (Of 
course, our own established, “normal” lifestyles are well worth subsidizing, 
thank you.) 
 A serviceable, operational definition of the political term 
“conservatism” is that it identifies the collection of social responses that have 
staunchly resisted the rights claims of one group after another – workers, African 
Americans, women, gays and lesbians, people under detention, and so forth in 
modern history.  Some of my students say that they are conservative.  I reply, 
“Oh, that’s interesting.  What exactly is it that you want to conserve?”  Often that 
question is greeted with stunned silence.  I am usually too polite to ask the 
7  RICHARD PERRY LOVING et ux., Appellants, v. VIRGINIA, Decided June 12, 1967. 
http://www.ameasite.org/loving.asp 
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obvious follow-up question:  “Is it white, male, heterosexist, propertied privilege 
that you seek to conserve? 
In summary, the history of modern politics and modern democracy 
includes a proliferation of rights claims and rights movements that have become 
the focus of much political creativity and enormous conflicts.  Have we reached 
the end of this astonishing proliferation of rights claims, or are we just getting 
started? 
  A second, closely related issue has to do with the presence of 
technology in many controversies about rights.  Ed Roberts and the movement of 
people with disabilities successfully argued that the limitations they encountered 
were far less a matter of their own physical make up, than of properties in the 
built environment and the technologies that confronted them every day.   
Once they got rolling, the Rolling Quads demanded technical innovations like 
cut away curbs on sidewalks, ramps and elevators for buildings, lifts in public 
transportation, adaptations in computer hardware and software, new 
communications devices, and countless other material improvements, arguing 
that equal rights and equal protection of the law required (among other things) a 
thoroughly reengineered world.  This was a highly productive strategy for the 
movement of people with disabilities to follow.  It pointed to their inherent 
equality and dignity as persons while calling for specific, sensible, achievable 
reforms.  The principles, problems and remedies in question were fairly easy for 
the public, lawmakers, architects and engineers to understand.  
 While this movement advances the cause of particular groups in society, 
their approach also contains what I believe is a profound, general insight.  For all 
of us, not just people with disabilities, the possibilities for action and fulfillment 
we experience are deeply involved with the technologies that surround us – the 
way they are structured, how they operate, what conditions and requirements 
they impose. Together with our own bodies and our social ties, these technical 
things play themselves out in a variety of rules, roles, relationships, and 
institutions.  This is the thrust of my argument that technology is legislation.   
 Taken as separate entities and as a whole collective ensemble, 
technologies constitute a world that either sustains us physically and spiritually, 
or imposes conditions that vex us and endanger our freedom and wellbeing.  At a 
period of history in which many of our practices, relationships and institutions 
are heavily infused with technologies of one sort or another, democratic political 
thought must find ways to understand agents and situations in this light.  Posing 
issues of this kind as questions about human rights seems to me an especially 
promising avenue to pursue.  At issue are specific configurations within 
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technologies that confront us everyday and whether or not we have an effective 
voice in shaping their design, operation and broader effects.  
 Here again it is worth considering the “world,” the techno-social world 
that confronted people with disabilities in earlier times.  My own experience of 
this world did not begin with my acquaintance with Ed Roberts.  I had seen it 
already as a child growing up in California.  There was a facility for so-called 
“crippled children” right across the playground from the elementary school I 
attended in central coastal California.  On occasion we so-called “normal 
children” would visit the school and watch the “crippled children” through the 
two way mirrors, learning to feel sorry for them.  It was a nicely self-contained 
world, a human creation filled with lots of science, medicine, technical 
professionalism, social care, and many elaborate, costly technological devices.  
But it eventually became obvious that this world was defective to its very core 
because it was quietly, covertly predicated on harsh judgments of inequality, 
inferiority and pity.   
 In the 1960s this nicely maintained world began to seem offensive to 
those who were its subjects.  Many people began to object to being called 
“crippled” or “retarded” with all the moral baggage that carried.  They began to 
feel offended by the sensibilities upon which the categories, practices and 
institutions that surrounded them were based.  Some of them set out to bring the 
whole system down and to replace it with a different socio-technical world, one 
more favorable to the millions of people with disabilities around the globe. 
 Ed Roberts was one of those who took on both the language and techno-
social conditions of “cripples.” His writings and interviews are filled with 
passionate, sometimes amusing, deconstructions of the terms and underlying 
beliefs that had depicted people with disabilities as second class citizens. In 1970 
he wrote, “I'm tired of well meaning noncripples with their stereotypes of what I 
can and cannot do directing my life and my future. I want cripples to direct their 
own programs and to be able to train other cripples to direct new programs. This 
is the start of something big -- cripple power.”8   
 Of course, Roberts was using the offensive term “cripple” for its shock 
value.  One of the reforms he proposed was a sweeping change in the way people 
with disabilities described themselves and how others talked about them as well. 
 At a time in which I was beginning to think about politics and 
technology, I also watched the movement of people with disabilities taking shape 
8 Quoted in, “Ed Roberts: ‘Father of Independent Living’”: 
http://www.ilusa.com/links/022301ed_roberts.htm 
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in Berkeley.  I visited the Center for Independent Living and spoke with some of 
the activists there.  But it took a while for me to recognize the connection 
between what they were saying and political issues emerging in the field of 
science and technology studies.9  Ed Roberts and his colleagues openly 
demanded the right to participate in the shaping and reform of specific 
technologies and institutions that had constituted them as disabled and inferior.  
They demanded participation of this kind as expression of human rights within 
democratic society.   
Demands of this kind raise an important question for every human 
being.  The well being of us all depends, to a great extent, upon the 
sociotechnical configurations that surround us.  Perhaps we too should demand a 
right to influence the design of technologies and architectures -- new ones and 
older ones – that condition our ways of living.  Looking back on progressive, 
justice seeking social movements of the past two centuries it becomes clear the 
extent to which technological settings and technology related boundaries were 
sometimes deeply involved in the dynamics of rights struggles. Rights were 
expressed as claims about the workings of the technologies and social 
relationships in various industries.  Working people would often say: The 
machines are physically dangerous.  We have a right to a safe workplace.  
Factory processes involving chemicals threaten our health.  We have a right to 
work under healthy conditions.  
Sometimes the remedies had to do with changing work rules, measures 
that sought more favorable sociotechnical conditions for workers without 
physically altering the instruments.  On other occasions the remedies did entail 
material modifications to hardware, both simple and complex, of the tools 
workers were required to use.  A classic example of the politics of technological 
design in the fields of California where there occurred decades long struggles 
over “el cortito,” the short handled hoe.  Farm workers objected to its shape and 
its enforced use because the hoe was hard on their bodies and imposed onerous 
conditions of discipline. The bosses could always see who was working because 
they were bending over; those who were standing upright were subject to 
                                                          
9 This was before the arrival of the carefully crafted, apolitical methodologies and “theories” favored 
among academics in “S.T.S.” today.  The growing irrelevance of the field is indicated by how few 
social activists or policy makers find any use for its sterile, uncritical perspectives on real 
technological choices and their significance.  As the twenty-first century unfolds, the best writing on 
social issues about technology comes from good investigative journalists and from writers actually 
involved – on one side or another – in day to day struggles over which technological forms will be 
realized and which ones rejected.   
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reprimand.  After many years of struggle, el cortito was eventually outlawed by 
the State of California.  At the funeral of Ceasar Chavez, leader of the fight for 
the rights of farm workers, el cortito was placed on the altar as a symbol of 
struggle and victory.10 
  Over the years there have been numerous labor disputes about the 
introduction of new technologies. Unfortunately, in the U.S. (by and large) 
demands about the right to shape new workplace systems have typically been 
negotiated away by labor unions in favor of demands about wages, hours and 
benefits.  In general, unions have yielded to pressure from business firms, giving 
up the right to configure new hardware and software.  To my way of thinking, 
this preference of union leaders has been a major factor in the demise of unions 
in the U.S. during a period in which automation and other technologically 
embodied changes have decimated the industrial workforce.   
 In European and Scandinavian social democracies, the rights of 
technology shaping in the workplace have been emphasized more forcefully.  
Labor unions have secured co-determination agreements that recognize the rights 
of labor to cooperate with management in deciding which new sociotechnical 
arrangements will be created.  In some notable cases, especially in Denmark, 
these habits of technology shaping have spilled over into other spheres, involving 
local communities whose rights to influence changes in technologies of 
communication, computing, transit, and others have frequently been recognized.  
The thinking of many Scandinavians on the matter goes something like this:  
“The new technologies are going to change our way of life.  Don’t we have a 
right to influence the form of these things, matching them to desirable patterns of 
individual and community life?” 11  
 It is possible that this expanded sense of rights – the right to shape 
technology – could become an even more important part of political debate in the 
future. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, probably 
the most ambitious, widely recognized statement of the depth and breath of 
rights claims, does not mention any such right.  However, many of the specific 
rights it does identify clearly have strong implications for the kinds of 
technological circumstances that confront all humans on the planet, including: 
“life, liberty and security of person,” 
“privacy…[of] family, home or correspondence,” 
10 See Maurice Jourdane, Struggle for Farm Workers' Health and Legal Protection: El Cortito  
(Huston: Arte Public Press, 1994). 
11 The best study of the possibilities here remains Dick Sclove, Democracy and Technology (New 
York: Guilford Press, 1995). 
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“ freedom of thought, conscience and religion,”  
“freedom of opinion and expression,”   
“freedom … to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media,”  
“freedom of peaceful assembly and association,”  
“right to take part in the government of his country,”  
“right of equal access to public service,” 
“the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity 
and the free development of his personality,” 
“the right to work…[and] just and favourable conditions of work,” 
“a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family” 
“the right to education,” 
“the full development of the human personality,” 
“the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community,” 
and numerous other rights as well. 
 
Given the conditions of life in world increasingly infused with technologies of 
many kinds, it is clear that many of the articles of the Universal Declaration have 
clear technological dimensions.  As a practical matter, in such a world, any 
attempt to realize particular rights would require an ability to influence the form 
and operation of technologies that condition the exercise of those rights.  It is a 
general recognition this right – the right to shape technology – that now seems 
poised to have a major role in moral discourse and the political discourse about 
the future of democracy.   
There is, of course, a significant shadow that falls over this possibility. 
In many political societies the belief that people have the right to influence 
technologies that affect their well-being is strongly limited by what is taken to be 
a stronger, deeper, more basic set of rights claims, namely those having to do 
with ownership of property.  As regards decisions about proposed changes of all 
kinds  -- innovations in the workplace, installation of energy producing facilities, 
creation of information networks, the making and marketing of pharmaceuticals, 
commercial land development and the like, property rights are often regarded as 
supreme.  And because when we talk about property, we are often discussing 
investments in technologies of various kinds, that is where the discussion about 
technology choice often begins and ends.   
One can trace the strength of this prejudice to ideas about rights, 
liberties and the origins of government that emerge in John Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Government and similar discussions that defined the basic terms of 
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liberal democracy three centuries ago.  Locke argues that we mix our labor with 
things in nature and thereby make them our property over which we have 
undeniable rights.  In his view it is the insecurity of life and property that 
eventually brings people together to form civil society and government.  Property 
becomes a kind of primal, undeniable right upon which everything else builds.  
So strong is this judgment in modern political thought that other claims about 
rights are bound to seem weak, even frivolous.  A consequence has been to favor 
the claims of major property owners – the corporations and their shareholders – 
over the claims of people who have much at stake in decisions about what will 
be built and applied.  For example, insofar as technology includes what is called 
“development” --  building of facilities on pieces of private property, the techno-
social-architectural matrices of development – citizens who might wish to claim 
rights to shape the artificial environs of their communities find themselves 
struggling against an ideology that holds property rights supreme and univocal.  
Under certain circumstances it is possible to counter this deeply seated 
prejudice in our political and legal system, to uphold citizen rights predicated on 
concerns other than those of property.   In some parts of the U.S. the laws and 
regulations governing public health and environmental quality provide openings 
for contesting what would otherwise be the unfettered development of property.  
In recent years I have participated in groups that organized grassroots opposition 
to a proposal to build an enormous $350 million cement plant on the banks of the 
Hudson River.  Last April the New York Department of State refused to issue 
permits needed to build the factory.  Shortly thereafter the St. Lawrence Cement 
Company withdrew its proposal.  In this case, rights for citizens to participate in 
the decision-making process had been provided within state environmental laws 
passed decades earlier -- public hearings and opportunities for “public comment” 
are required for projects likely to have significant effects upon environment. 
Citizens of the State of New York have a legal right to comment and state 
agencies have an obligation to listen to these comments as part of the decision-
making process.  At the decisive moment in the St. Lawrence deliberations, some 
14,000 letters were sent to the Department of State, 87% of which opposed the 
cement plant.  The rights to participate here were by no means lavish.  But the 
definition of democracy had been widened to include the rights of citizens to 
have some voice, even in a situation in which hundreds of millions in property 
were at stake.   In this case, the very small wedge of citizen influence about 
technology choice seems to have been decisive.   
 Unfortunately, within the neoliberal logic of international trade 
agreements, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, 
the rights of citizens to petition their governments on disputes of this kind are 
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now being undermined.  What the trade agreements strongly favor are the rights 
claims of corporate investors.  Thus, the basic Lockean arguments about property 
and its primacy in the most fundamental matters of government are extended to 
the global economic and political sphere. For example, in many decisions about 
how technologies will be configured for widespread use, considerations about 
the rights involved in “intellectual property” are the ones that carry the most 
force.  Students in engineering, law and, regrettably, even philosophy are 
regularly instructed in elaborate ways to honor “intellectual property” even when 
these measures conflict with the most basic considerations of human rights in the 
countries affected.   
At the same time, if one looks carefully, one finds a good number of 
political movements at that reflect a desire to shape technologies that affect the 
quality of life.  In many parts of the world, for example, there is strong resistance 
to the institutions that control media of mass communication. A great many 
people have concluded that the current mix of corporations and communications 
technologies is oppressive.  In the community media movement there is a 
continuing resistance to the form and management of today’s communications 
technology and an energetic search for alternatives.12 
 Another technological and institutional device, a particular kind of 
computing and communications system, has also become a focus of protest in the 
U.S.A. and elsewhere.  Its name is Wal-Mart.   
 “But that’s not a technology,” you say.   Look again.  The backbone of 
Wal-Mart, the mechanism that gives it tremendous power is a worldwide, 
computer-centered system of supply chain management.  The hundreds of 
communities that now resist the economic, environmental and damage brought 
by Wal-Mart have decided to confront what amounts to a new, formidable 
variety of sociotechnical institution.  Many have realized that in its fully 
articulated form, this technology centered mode of product distribution and 
marketing will determine the quality of life, undermining the autonomy of towns 
and whole regions for decades to come.  Is there a right to intervene to prevent or 
modify the spread of the sociotechnical form called “Wal-Mart”?  Many people 
these days are seeking creative ways to do just that.13 
                                                          
12 A good overview of the issues involved is offered in Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor 
Democracy 
Communication Politics in Dubious Times (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999).  
13 For an even-handed discussion of Wal-Mart’s mode of operation, see Charles Fishman, The Wal-
Mart Effect : How the World's Most Powerful Company Really Works--and How It's Transforming 
the American Economy (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).  For an overview of issues stressed by 
those who resist the store’s coming, see Bill Quinn,  How Wal-Mart Is Destroying America and the 
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In that light, a concept that comes up in discussions about technology 
and rights is not only that of “property owner,” but also “stakeholder.”  One does 
not have to be the owner of property to have a legitimate stake in how a 
particular technological application will be deployed and what its effects will be.  
To have a substantial claim in this respect, one does not have to be a corporation, 
a government agency or member of any of the organized interests that have 
influenced important technological choices in the past.  As a citizen who will 
experience the consequences of technological change, one can claim to have a 
stake in the results.   
In spring of 2003 I testified to a committee of the U.S. Congress on this 
point, suggesting that a bill to provide funding for the emerging field of 
nanotechnology contain a provision for citizen oversight of nanotech research 
and development. I argued that because they are both tax payers and ultimate 
stakeholders in the results, citizens had a right to participate in decisions about 
the paths that nanotechnology might take.  Much to my surprise, some members 
of Congress liked the idea and the eventual law included a provision for the 
creation of citizen’s panels to evaluate major initiatives in government sponsored 
nanotech research.  Unfortunately, the funds allocated under this provision so far 
have gone to the usual suspects, to university research centers in the social 
sciences.  Evidently, creating a new institution -- citizen’s panels -- to evaluate 
new technology is not something the American political system knows how to do 
at present.  
 
 
Conclusion 
No one can reliably predict how changes in the recognition of important rights 
claims will expand or contract.  Indeed, some promising initiatives to expand the 
horizons of rights have been rebuffed, derailed by reactionary opponents.  For 
example, in the U.S.A., the Equal Rights Amendment, recognizing equal rights 
for people regardless of sex, first proposed in 1921 and long considered a natural 
step in the evolution of constitutional rights, has never been adopted and 
probably die of neglect.  In a similar way, the recent push for the right of gay 
marriage and even the right of civil union has encountered fierce backlash, 
outlawed in elections and pieces of legislation around the country.    
 
 
World: And What You Can Do about It, third edition (Berkeley: Ten Speed Press, 2005). 
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Will the right to shape technology rise or fall on the list of rights claims 
that will engage attention of democratic societies around the globe in years to 
come? Only time will tell. Despite the backwards-looking, terror obsessed 
tendencies evident in many world societies today, it is still possible to hope for a 
turn towards more enlightened policies.   
 Looking at the noble but, alas, widely ignored document, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, one finds twenty-nine articles that specify which 
human rights must be recognized.  Article thirty is added for clarification.  
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”   
 I would make that “Section 1” of that last article and then add another 
key provision.  It would read:  “Because the practical realization of many of the 
rights identified in this Declaration involve the presence, structure and use of 
technologies of many kinds, every person on Earth has the right to a role in 
shaping the technical instruments, processes and institutions that affect their 
well-being.” 
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